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1 . Introduction: The General Form of the Model
This study presents an econometric model of the world copper industry,
relatively disaggregated to incorporate different supply equations for each of
the major producing countries and different demand equations for each of the
principal consuming areas. Largely for reasons of data, the model is an annual
one and there is no breakdown into types of copper use. Attention in the
construction and use of the model centers on the geographic differences in the
industry and on the two-price system generally prevailing wherein much of the
copper in the United States moves at the U.S. producer price whereas most other
copper moves at the London Metal Exchange (LME) price which, in recent years,
has often been well above the U.S. producer price.
A general simplified outline of the structure of the model is as follows.
We are indebted to Nancy Greene, Brendon Horton, and Alan Marin for
research and computational assistance and to Paul Rosenstein-Rodan for helpful
comments. We greatly benefited from discussions of the technology, structure,
and marketing practices of the copper industry with many persons at the Corpor-
acion del Cobre de Chile. Sonia Klein and David McNicol, also working on copper
models, participated in helpful discussions. Errors are our own responsibility,
however
.
We begin with the U.S. market. The U.S. producers set the U.S. producer
price to reflect what they believe to be a sustainable (and profitable) long-run
level of copper prices, taking into account their own resulting supply decisions.
They then take that price as given for the time being, believing it in their
interest to have a relatively stable price, and decide on the amount of copper
they will supply at that price. Other countries selling at the U.S. producer
price do the same. This determines the supply of primary copper in the United
States (except for imports)
.
Consumers of copper, on the other hand, take price as given. Some of those
consumers will be able to buy at the U.S. producer price; some of them may not.
The latter consumers can import copper at the LME price or can purchase scrap.
Total demand for copper is also influenced (and very largely) by indicators of
general industrial activity and by the free market price of aluminum, the
principal substitute.
The supply of secondary copper in the United States depends in the model
on the total amount of primary copper produced in the past, on the ease with
which that copper can be gathered as scrap and on the scrap price which is very
highly correlated with the LME price (as one would expect ) . The ease of col-
lection is taken as measured by the relative amount of previously produced
copper collected in the previous year, being low when that was high and a great
deal of the readily available copper already collected. A fuller description
is given below.
Despite the fact that the two prices are very highly correlated, they do
not seem to be equal after allowances for transportation and conversion costs.
The difference between U.S. total copper consumption and U.S. available sup-
plies (primary, secondary, and imports) is the decrease (or increase) in U.S.
inventories. If inventories tend to increase for some period of time and the
LME price is below the U.S. producer's price, then producers gradually conclude
that they set too high a price and that the proper long-run price is below the
U.S. producer price. On the other hand, if inventories are being depleted over
some period of time and the LME price is well above the U.S. producer price,
then the producers gradually conclude that the proper long-run price is above
the U.S. producer price. They then readjust the U.S. producer price in the
indicated direction and the process begins again.
The model for the rest of the world operates in a similar fashion except
that the LME price to which it responds is a free market price (most of the
time). Given expectations about the LME price, producers selling at that price
make output decisions and consumers buying at that price make consumption deci-
sions (which are, of course, influenced by other variables as well). Scrap
supply depends on factors similar to those operating in the U.S. Given the
total supply of primary from producing countries, total supply of secondary,
and net exports to the U.S., the total supply of copper available for consump-
tion outside the U.S. is determined. The difference between this and total
copper actually consumed gives the additions to inventories. The LME price
responds to the size of inventories relative to total use of copper.
The two markets are linked in three ways. First, as already stated, the
U.S. scrap price is highly correlated with the LME price, as both markets are
generally free. Second, there is some flow of copper between the U.S. and
the rest of the world, Finally, producers take a large difference between the
LME and the U.S. producer price as a signal that the U.S. market is probably out
of long-run equilibrium and the U.S. producer price should be adjusted.
2. How and Why Does the Two-Market System Work?
The two-market system described above obviously requires further discussion.
In particular, when the U.S. producer price is substantially below the LME price,
as has often been the case in recent years, what keeps arbitrage from reducing
the LME price and depleting U.S. stocks? Further, why do the U.S. producers con-
sider it in their interest to maintain such a situation?
Part of the answer to the first question is that there do exist forces tend-
ing to bring the two prices closer together, although these forces are not fast-
acting and strong. When the LME price is above the U.S. price for an extended
period because demand is high, U.S. stocks do get drawn down and the producer
price adjusted upward. Nevertheless, a high degree of arbitrage does not take
place, presumably because in such a situation, when U.S. nroducers ration their
sales, favored customers are unwilling to jeopardize their long-run relations
with the producers for the sake of the short-run gains from arbitrage. Presuma-
bly, producers can fairly readily discover if a large customer is reselling on
the LME.
The question remains, however, as to why it is in the interests of the
producers to act in this way rather than adjusting the price upward immediately
to the market clearing level and reaping the short-run returns from selling to
more customers at higher prices. The basic answer seems to lie in the lag
structure of behavior on both sides of the copper market. It will be a repeated
theme of this study and is well borne out in the results below that speeds of
adjustment in the copper industry are very low. On the supply side this comes
from the length of time necessary to bring new mines into production and the
high investment in the working of existing mines. On the demand side, it occurs,
at least in part, because of the length of time required to readapt some copper-
using equipment to use aluminum. Such long lags mean that the price-elasticities
of demand and supply are both substantially higher in the long than in the short
run, and, as we shall see, supply elasticity, especially, is quite small in the
short run and rather substantial in the long run. This leads to a fairly unstable
situation in the short run where a small increase in the exogenous factors affect-
ing demand can easily raise short-run market-clearing prices very considerably,
even though the price which equilibrates long-run supply and long-run demand may
not be much affected.
In this situation, the major U.S. producers may hesitate to raise price to
reap short-run rewards for fear of doing two things. First, a large rise might
encourage customers who can use aluminum to invest in aluminum-using machinery.
Both the experience gained with that machinery and the time required to change
back to copper would mean that such customers would not switch back again for a
long time when prices fell. Indeed, it is not hard to see that, given the
fact that the changeover is costly, copper producers may gain more by keeping
copper prices to such customers just below the point at which the changeover
to aluminum becomes profitable than they would be going above that point and
later trying to regain those customers as price fell toward its long-run equi-
librium, since the regaining of those customers would require a fall in price
not merely to its original level but to a level low enough to compensate for the
cost of switching back to copper.
Since an inability to obtain copper would also provide an incentive to switch
to aluminum, this argument suggests that the producers operate by rationing only
those customers who cannot switch or for whom the cost of switching is low.
This suggests that manufacturers of wire are generally able to purchase at the
U.S. producer price, but it is difficult to obtain direct evidence on this point.
A second reason for not raising the U.S. producer price to the short-run
market clearing level may be that such a rise would be taken by other producers,
particularly Canadian ones, as a signal that the long-run price was rising. This
would begin to bring new mines into production and, given that the lags are so
long, the resulting effects on supply would not disappear when the circumstances
substantially raising the short-run market-clearing price ceased to operate. In
this situation, the producers may prefer to forego the possible short-run profits
rather than encourage new production which will appear on the market when the
situation has changed.
Obviously, this second argument assumes that the short-run nature of the
given situation is seen differently by the U.S. producers and the operators of
potential new mines. However, once having established a system whereby the U.S.
producer price is an index of what the U.S. producers believe a sustainable long-
run price to be, those producers may hesitate to change it because a new, higher
U.S. producer price may be taken to signal a high long-run price and may be acted
on as such.
This implication has been drawn by David McNicol. See [9 1.
These considerations are difficult to support with hard evidence, although
the producers are explicitly disturbed about irreversible substitution effects.
They at least make plausible a situation which clearly does exist, the existence
of which must be recognized in any adequate model of the copper industry.
3 . Distributed Lags and Estimation Methods
Since, as stated, many of the crucial reactions in the copper industry take
a good deal of time, the corresponding equations of the model are formulated in
terms of distributed lags, with the dependent variable being influenced by past
as well as present independent variables. The simplest and best-known formulation
of distributed lags, and the one we have employed, is the Koyck or geometric lag
,
which can also be formulated as a stock adjustment model, along the following
lines.
We take as an example, the supply curve of mine-produced copper in some
country. Denote the amount of copper supplied in year t by S and the price
received by the producers in question by P . Given the price, the producers
would like to supply an amount S , which depends on P according to the long-run
supply equation:
(3.1) S* = a + 6 P
t
say. However, since it takes time to adjust supply, they do not immediately
See Koyck [ 6 ] and Nerlove [10 ] .
move to a new value for S in response to a new value for price, but rather
begin to move in that direction. If we assume that it is only possible to move
some fixed fraction, p, of the desired distance in any year, then:
(3.2) S
t
- S
t _1
= p(S* - S
t _1
) (0 < u < 1)
Substituting (3.1) into (3.2) and rearranging terms:
(3.3) S
t
= pa + uB P
t
+ (1 - y)S
t_1
Lag (3.3) and obtain an expression for S , , then lag it again and obtain one
for S , and so forth. Repeated substitution of the lagged versions into (3.3)
yields (where A = 1 - u) :
(3.4) S = a + pB E A
6
P .
C 6=0 t_9
so that supply in year t depends on present and past prices with the weights
given to lagged prices declining geometrically with the length of the lag. In
this model, the short-run effect of price on supply is given by u8 , but the long-
run effect is given by g itself. If \i is relatively small, so that adjustments
take place fairly slowly, then the long-run effect can be much larger than the
short-run one. We would expect this in the case of copper supply.
There is another model which leads to the form (3.4) and its equivalent
(3.3) (other than postulating (3.4) directly). This is to suppose that adjust-
ments can in fact be completely made but that supply depends upon expected
price, with expectations being formed in an adaptive wav, as follows. Suppose
that the supply curve is given by:
(3.5) S
t
= o + 6 P*
*
where P denotes expected long-run price. Suppose further that nrice expecta-
tions are formed by revising earlier expectations in the direction of actual
prices, according to the relation:
(3.6) P* - P*_
1
= y(P
t
- P*_
x
) (0 < u < 1)
Here \i is no longer the speed of adjustment of supply, but rather the speed of
adjustment of price expectations. Equation (3.6) is equivalent to:
(3.7) P* = UP
t
+ (1 - u)\_
±
so that expected price this year is a weighted average of expected price last
year and actual price. Repeated lagging of (3.7) and substitution for lagged
*
values of P yields
00
(3.8) P* = m E A
9
P^ X = 1 - v
t
e=o
t_e
so that expected price is also a weighted sum of present and lagged prices, with
the weights declining geometrically with the length of the lag. Substitution of
(3.8) into (3.5) now yields (3.4).
Despite the fact that the two models are equivalent as regards the final
supply equation, the stock-adjustment version makes much more sense than the
adantive expectations version for relations in the copper industry. It is per-
fectly clear that adjustments do take a considerable time; moreover, price ex-
pectations are not likely to be formed in the way described by (3.6) to (3.8),
since, especially in the U.S. market, participants are likely to take current
price as a much better index of relatively long-run price than is a weighted
average of past prices, with X much different from zero. Our interpretation
will run in terms of the stock-adjustment model, therefore, and we have made no
attempt simultaneously to incorporate the adaptive expectations feature.
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Estimation of the stock-adjustment model requires some care. The easiest
form in which to estimate it is (3.3), but merely estimating this by ordinary
least squares (aside from the fact that P is an endogenous variable) will lead
to inconsistency if the error term is autocorrelated. Such autocorrelation is
quite likely in such models. It is not possible satisfactorily to treat a very
general model of autocorrelation, and we have settled for a model in which the
error term in question is first-order autocorrelated, an assumption which proba-
bly comes as close to the truth as any which the data will support. Thus, deno-
ting the error term in (3.3) by u , and assuming it enters additively, we assume:
(3.9) u
t
= p u
x
+ e
t
2
where e is assumed to have expectation zero and variance-covariance matrix a I,
thus not itself being autocorrelated. For cases (not the supply equations) in
which the right-hand side variables of such equations are predetermined (being
either exogenous to the model or lagged endogenous variables) , we proceed by
choosing estimates of p and the other parameters to minimize the sum of squares
of e . This is a consistent estimator and, if e is normally distributed, it is
also maximum likelihood. On the normality assumption, asymptotic standard errors
can be computed.
When (as in the supply equations) one or more of the right-hand side varia-
bles are endogenous, an adaptation of the same technique, due to R. Fair [ 3 ] is
2
used. This is an instrumental variables technique which takes care of simulta-
See Cooper [ l] for details.
2
Fair observes that the asymptotic standard errors are difficult to calculate,
but this is not the case, since instead of replacing sample values by probability
limits, one can calculate the sample version of the asymptotic standard errors, re-
lying on the fact that the formulae are only asymptotic in anv case.
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neous equations bias as well as of autocorrelation of the sort (3.9). It re-
quires that among the instruments be the current and once lagged values of all
predetermined variables in the equation and the lagged values of all endogenous
variables in the equation. In the results below, we indicate the instrumental
variables used in estimating each equation.
Before closing this section, we may remark that the autocorrelation assump-
tion (3.9) is restrictive, not merely because it is first-order, but also because
it assumed that, given u
, u is not correlated with the past values of distur-
bances from other equations in the model. This is far better than assuming it is
uncorrelated with the current values of such disturbances, but it is still pretty
strong. More general assumptions are very difficult to handle, however.
Estimation of the supply equations for scrap copper presents certain special
difficulties, since those equations, as will be seen below, are nonlinear in the
parameters. We shall discuss the methods used in the section on the scrap supply
equations
.
4. Supply of Primary Copper
In this section, we report the results for estimation of supply curves for
primary copper (mine production) . Separate supply curves were estimated for the
United States, Chile, Zambia, Canada, and the Rest of World. The relative impor-
tance of the various suppliers can be seen from the figures for 1963 :
Data sources are listed and discussed in the appendix.
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TABLE 4.1
Mine Production of Copper, 1963 (thousand metric tons)
United States 1100.6
Chile 601.1
Zambia 588.1
Canada 410.6
Rest of World 3 1174.4
Total
3
3874.8
Excludes Eastern-bloc countries
The principal suppliers for which separate supply curves were not estimated
are Peru, Republic of Congo, and Janan. Data problems were insuperable as
regards the Congo; Japanese production did not seem large enough to warrant
a separate effort; and an attempt to estimate a separate equation for Peru failed.
It will be noticed that a supply curve for Chile was estimated. As part of
the purpose of the model is to examine the likely effect of alternative Chilean
policies, that supply curve is used only for purposes of comparison. Forecasts
will be made which examine the effects of departures from the supply relationship
which has obtained in the past.
For the United States, the price of copper used in the supply equation was
the Engineering and Mining Journal price deflated by the U.S. wholesale price
index. The EMJ price is a weighted average of the U.S. producer price and the
LME price, with the U.S. producer price getting more than 97.5% of the weight
(this equation is reported in the section on prices) . It apparently reflects
13
the prices at which copper is actually traded in the U.S. a bit more accurately
than does the U.S. producer price. Nevertheless, according to the description
of the model given in the opening section, it ought to be the U.S. producer
price itself which enters the supply relation. Experimentation shows that the
results obtained using the EMJ price are uniformly better and more reasonable
than those obtained using the U.S. producer price directly and we have proceeded
on that basis. This phenomenon can be rationalized by observing that when the
EMJ and U.S. producer price get substantially out of line, the chances are pretty
good that the latter price will be revised so that the EMJ price may capture
long-run expectations a bit better than does its principal component.
Denoting U.S. mine production (thousands of metric tons) by USMP and the
EMJ price (dollars per long ton) divided by the U.S. wholesale price index
(1957-59 = 1.00) by USP , the estimated U.S. supply equation is:
(4.1) USMP = - 160.04 + .6372 USP + .7261 USMP
C (.2129) tA)t (.2043) C l
(2.9964) (3.5545)
p = 0.5 Years: 1949-58, 1962-66.
In this, as in all later equations (save where noted), the figures in the first
line of parentheses are the asymptotic standard errors of the corresponding
estimated coefficients; the figures in the second line of parentheses are the
ratios of the estimated coefficients to their asymptotic standard errors. Small
sample significance tests are not known for such estimates, but a good rule of
thumb is that a coefficient at least twice its asymptotic standard error indicates
a statistically significant relationship.
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The figure denoted as p is the estimated first-order autocorrelation
coefficient of the disturbance in the equation; see equation (3.9), above. The
final estimates are obtained by searching over alternate values of p ranging
from -1.0 to +1.0 by steps of .1 and choosing those results (for all parameters)
for which the sum of squares being minimized is least.
As indicated, the years 1959-61 and 1967-68 have been omitted (our data run
through 1968 in other equations) . This has been done to eliminate the effect of
major copper strikes in the U.S. in 1959 and 1967-68.
The slow speed of adjustment in U.S. copper supply is indicated by the
coefficient of lagged mine production. Only a little more than a quarter (1.00 -
.73) of the gap between desired production and actual production is closed each
year (see the discussion in the preceding section) . This is naturally reflected
in a fairly large difference between short- and long-run supply elasticities. At
the point of means for the period, the short-run price elasticity of supply is
approximately .453, while the long-run elasticity is approximately 1.67. U.S.
adjustment speed, while slow, however, appears faster than the adjustment speed
of some of the other producing countries. To the results for those other countries
we now turn.
There is some difficulty in deciding on the appropriate price variable to
use in the Chilean supply curve because of the effect of the special exchange
rates which have been used to tax the copper producers and because of the Chilean
inflation. Fortunately, Mamalakis and Reynolds [ 7] calculate a series for the
The data begin before 1949, but the lags involved in the equation and the
estimation method used mean the loss of two years at the start of the time period.
Similarly, eliminating 1959 means eliminating 1960 and 1961 from direct use as
observations
.
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price received by the producers and, while this only goes through 1959, it has
been brought up to date by Vittorio Corbo Lioi who kindly made it available to us.
We denote that price (the money price is taken as 1.00 is 1965 and deflated by the
Chilean wholesale price index which is 1.00 in 1958) by ChP. Denoting Chilean
mine production (thousands of metric tons) by ChMP, the results were as follows:
(4.2) ChMP = 91.37 + 415.4 ChP + .7206 ChMP
1 (164.9) (.1309)
(2.520) (5.505)
p = - 0.1 Years: 1948-68.
The speed of adjustment is just about the same as in the U.S. At the point of
means for the period, the short-run elasticity of supply is approximately .112,
rather less than for the U.S. Long-run elasticity, moreover, is approximately
.402, considerably less than the comparable U.S. figure. Chilean mine production
thus does not appear to have been very price sensitive.
For Canada, we used the EMJ price converted to Canadian dollars and deflated
2
by the Canadian wholesale price index (1958 = 1.00) as the price variable.
Denoting this by CanP and denoting Canadian mine production (thousands of metric
tons) by CanMP , the results are:
For comparison, a similar equation using the EMJ price and the U.S. whole-
sale price index was estimated. It differed from (4.2) in having a very slow
speed of adjustment and hence a high long-run (but not short-run) price elasticity.
The price term was smaller relative to its asymptotic standard error than in (4.2),
however and we accept (4.2) as the superior equation. The alternate results were:
(4.2') ChMP = - 54.43 + 274.0 USP + .9517 ChMP
t (156.6) hMJt (.0736) t l
(1.750) (12.921)
p = -0.2 Years: 1948-68.
2
Some fraction of Canadian supply is sold at the LME price. Some preliminary
attempts were made to include the LME price in the equation, but they were
unsuccessful.
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(4.3) CanMP = - 43.73 + .09505 CanP + .9873 CanMP
(.03901) (.03932) t i
(2.4367) (25.11)
p = -0.4 Years: 1948-67.
Clearly, the speed of adjustment is extremely low, far lower than for the
U.S. or Chile. Less than 2% of desired adjustments take place in any one year.
At the point of means for the period, the short-run elasticity of Canadian
supply is approximately .188 and the long-run elasticity is far greater, being
estimated at 14.84, although the exact figure is not very reliable.
The situation is rather similar for the estimated supply curve for Zambia.
Here we used the LME price (i. per long ton) deflated by an index of the cost of
living for Europeans in Zambia. Denoting this price by ZP and Zambian mine
production (thousands of metric tons) by ZMP, the results are:
(4.4) ZMP = - 69.19 + .1269 ZP
T
+ 1.103 ZMP
t (.4446) LMht (.3138) t_i
(.2832) (3.547)
p = -0.3 Years: 1955-57, 1961-65.
The poorer quality of these results compared to the others doubtless reflects the
poor data and the number of observations that had to be dropped because of strikes
and political troubles. At the point of means, the short-run price elasticity of
Zambian supply is approximately .0684, while the long-run elasticity is far
greater. Indeed, as estimated, the effects of past prices never die out, although
2
the coefficient of lagged mine production is not significantly above unity, but
the speed of adjustment is obviously extremely slow, although ultimately the
There is not much choice in terms of available data. There is also an
incomplete series on the cost of living of Africans in Zambia.
2
In forecasting with the model, that coefficient is set at unity.
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Zambian supply curve is nearly flat. The very high long-run elasticities ought
to be expected where new mines are developing and old ones far from exhausted.
The remaining supply curve estimated was for the rest of the world. The
price variable used was the LME price expressed in dollars per long ton deflated
by the U.S. wholesale price index (1957-59 = 1.00). Denoting this by USP TV„ andLME
Rest-of-World mine production (thousands of metric tons) by RWMP, the results are:
(4.5) RWMP = - 28.44 + .2222 USP + .8832 RWMP
C (.09561) LM" (.09601) C L
(2.3239) (9.1991)
p = 0.5 Years: 1948-68.
The speed of adjustment here is still low, but is higher than in Zambian and
Canadian results. At the point of means for the period, the short-run elasticity
of Rest-of-World supply is approximately .1963 and the long-run elasticity is
approximately 1.680.
This completes the results for primary supply. In the estimation of the
equations in this section, the instrumental variables used in addition to those
required for the Fair method (see the preceding section) were as follows: the
lagged ratio of non-U. S. stocks of copper to non-U. S. total use of copper (this
appears in the price equations below) ; the lagged value of whichever of the LME
and EMJ price did not appear in the particular equation being estimated; the
lagged value of separately accounted for Western Hemisphere total mine production,
taken as moving primarily at the EMJ price (U.S., Chile, and Canada); and the
lagged value of the remaining mine production taken as moving primarily at the
2
LME price (Zambia and Rest-of-World). In the case of Chile, both the lagged
This is not a very satisfactory deflator, but it is difficult to see how
to improve it much.
2
In the case of the Zambian supply curve (4.4), where there were relatively
few observations, only the sum of the last two variables was used.
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LME and the lagged EMJ price were used as were the two ratios of the Chilean
price (ChP) to the other two prices, since presumably those ratios reflect
exogenous governmental actions in Chile.
In a few cases in which data on instrumental variables were missing for
a year or so at the beginning of the period, we extrapolated backwards to construct
them. Note that this was not done for the variables actually appearing in the
equation.
382 .7
629 .3
1328,.9
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5 . Secondary Supply
We now consider the supply of copper from scrap. Here we divide the world
into the United States and the rest of the world. The breakdown available in
the data is somewhat different for the two regions. Some idea of the order of
magnitudes involved may be gained from Table 5.1 which reports figures for 1963,
TABLE 5.1
Secondary Supply of Copper, 1963 (thousand metric tons)
United States Old Scrap Collection
United States New Scrap
Rest of World Total Scrap 3
Total3 2340.9
Excludes Eastern-bloc countries
Old scrap is scrap created by the destruction of old fabricated products;
new scrap, on the other hand, is scrap created in the fabricating process itself
by cutting or similar actions. It is either returned to the refiner or used
again by the fabricator. While it is clear that both types of scrap are part of
secondary supply, it is not quite so clear whether the copper scrap which is
created by the fabricator should also be included in the variable representing
the demand for copper or whether new scrap should be subtracted. While it is
possible to argue on both sides of that question, the results for the demand
equations (reported in the next section) are far better when direct use of
scrap is included in demand and so all consumption figures in this study include
such scrap .
This follows usage in the data sources which call such a variable "total
use". Note that "consumption" in the sources does not include direct use of scrap
as do our "consumption" variables. (This is not the same issue as that discussed
in the text.) See the data appendix for the way in which new scrap figures were
calculated and for further discussion.
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Obviously, the two different ways in which scrap is generated suggest two
different models, and for the United States, the data permit their construction.
We begin with the more complex case of old scrap.
The prime determinants of old scrap collections in our model are: the
amount of copper available for collection in the broadest sense; the ease with
which that copper can be collected; and the price paid for it.
In the broadest sense, the amount of copper available for old scrap collection
in the United States is the total amount of copper embodied in already produced
copper products. The change in the available scrap supply during year t is given
by the identity:
(5.1) Change in available scrap supply = primary production + net imports
of refined copper + net imports of fabricated copper
- increases in stocks of copper.
If we knew the amount of copper available for collection in any given base year,
then the amount available in any other year could be calculated from (5.1). We
do not have such a benchmark figure, however, and, as a result, we have estimated
that figure as a parameter in our old scrap equation. Thus letting K be the
copper available at the beginning of year t, we write:
(5 - 2) Kt= K1948 +K t '
*
where K is obtained by cumulating (5.1) from the beginning of 1948 and K ,_ is to
be treated as a parameter (all figures below are in thousands of metric tons)
.
1948 is used as a benchmark because changes in copper stocks are unknown
before that date. The estimated equation begins with 1950 because K t_2 ^s
required by the estimation method. A similar statement holds for the rest of the
world (below) where K iqc. is taken as a benchmark and estimation starts with 1952.
21
Obviously, it is only in the broadest sense that all copper in the United
States is available for collection. In part, we account for this in our model
by explaining what fraction of K is in fact collected. It must be recognized,
however, that K._, R does not represent the cumulation of (5.1) from time imme-
morial, but rather represents the amount of copper in a rather narrower sense
available for scrap collection at the beginning of 1948. Indeed, this narrower sense
applies, of course, to copper produced or imported since 1948, so that K also
is broader than is strictly appropriate. Fortunately, it is easy to see that the
fact that not all produced or imported copper is really available for collection
matters very little to our model or results.
Denote United States old scran collections (thousands of metric tons) in
year t by USOS . The dependent variable in our equation below (its lagged value
will also appear) will be Log (USOS /K ) . Now suppose that instead of K being
available, some constant fraction of K , say 6, is available. Then the true
dependent variable should be Log (USOS /6K ) = Log (USOS /K ) - Log 6. Hence
the only effect of the difference between using K and 6K is to place a term inj a t t r
Log 6 in the constant term of our results.
Obviously, this argument makes it convenient to use a logarithmic model here;
moreover, it is natural to do so, since it is natural to think in terms of explain-
ing the fraction of available scrap which is actually collected.
As a proxy for a measure of the difficulty of collection, we use the fraction
of available scrap that was collected as such in the preceding year. This is not
The figure actually used was collection of old scrap. This includes a
small amount of imported scrap which does not precisely fit the model being
discussed
.
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a very direct measure of difficulty, but it makes sense if we think of available
copper as in forms and locations of differing ease of collection. One expects
the copper easiest to collect to be collected first; hence if a relatively large
amount of the available copper was collected last year, copper is likely to be
relatively hard to collect this year. Accordingly (and quite unusually) we
should expect the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable to be negative
.
There is a separate scrap price in the United States, but it is very highly
correlated with the LME price, as one would expect, since both are free market
prices. We found that it made little difference to the results which price was
used, and, accordingly, we simplified the model slightly by using the LME price
expressed in dollars per long ton and deflated by the U.S. wholesale price index
(1957-59 = 1.00). We denote that price by USPTl_.
Unfortunately, the estimation of the old scrap supply equation runs into a
minor but rather annoying difficulty. The equation is not linear in K , .
Accordingly, we proceeded by choosing alternate values for K and then estimating
the resulting equation, intending to choose the version in which the final sum of
2
squares was minimized. As it turns out, however, the results are quite insensitive
to the value of K chosen, suggesting that any estimate thereof will have a very
As already mentioned, however, it does not appear to be the case that the two
prices are equal after allowance for transportation and conversion costs. We are
unable to explain this.
2
The actual estimation procedure used was fairly complicated. First, USP
was regressed on its own lagged value, the lagged value of the EMJ price, the lagged
change in the ratio of stocks outside the U.S. to total consumption outside the U.S.
(see the section of prices, below), the lagged sum of mine production in the U.S.,
Ch-ile, and Canada, and the similar lagged sum for all other countries. This yielded
a predicted value of USP T ,^, which we shall call USP T ,_ . Then, for each choice ofI M ' * LMtj
K Fair's method was used to estimate the final equation with the^ instrumental
variables being those required by the method plus the logarithm of USP . Note that
different Fair method instruments arise for different choices of K ,
R
arid that
each such estimation requires a search over values of p.
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large asymptotic standard error. (The asymptotic standard errors reported below
are all conditional on the values of &.._,„ chosen.) This would perhaps not be
surprising — although it does not occur in the results for the rest of the
world, reported below — since it indicates that scrap collections are not very
dependent on copper produced before 1948; however, the sum of squares to be
minimized continues to decline slowly as a function of K until that parameter
is well beyond any reasonable value.
Fortunately, this makes essentially no difference to our estimate of the
price sensitivity of old scrap supply, our estimate of the effect of former
collections, or our implied forecast of old scrap collections. We therefore
present results for high and for low values of K
,
„» R as
well as for a value chosen
to bear roughly the same relation to U.S. consumption as the similarly estimated
figure for the rest of the world (below) bears to rest-of-world consumption.
That value of K is 60,000 thousand metric tons. When it is used, we obtain:
,
USOS \ .' USOS k
(5.3) Log/ - -\ = -8.187 - 0.3731 Log
* \
!
s
60,000 + K / (.1261) \60,000 + K
_
/
(-2.960)
+ 0.4222 Log USP
(.1064) LiUit
(3.968)
p = 0.9 Years: 1950-68 Sum of Squared Residuals = 0.08338
By way of comparison, if we use alternate estimates of K , q/o or 20,000 and
140,000 thousand metric tons, we obtain, respectively:
/ USOS \ / USOS
(5.4) Log; 5 -\ = - 7.3427 - 0.3761 Log/ ±-±r
! 20,000 + K / \^ 20, 000 + K j
+ 0.4371 Log USP^
p = 0.9 Sum of Squared Residuals = 0.08755
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and
/ USOS \ / USOS
_ \
(5.5) Log/ ^n = " 9 - 116 " °- 3822 L°g[ * 1
^140,000 + K
t /
lg.40,000 + K
_
+ 0.4417 Log USP
LMEt
p = 0.7 Sum of Squared Residuals = 0.07208
In all these equations, the short-run elasticity of old scrap supply with
respect to the LME price is about +.42 to +.44. The implied long-run elasticity
is lower because high scrap collections in one period mean lower ones in the
next period, other things equal), being about +.31 to +.32. The different choices
for K , affect only the second decimal place, and that only in a very minor way.
Our model for new scrap is much simpler; we estimated it as a linear function
2
of total consumption. Denoting U.S. new scrap collections by USNS and total
consumption (total use) by USC (both in thousands of metric tons) , the estimated
equation is:
(5.6) USNS = - 277.9 + 0.3961 USC
C (0.0524) fc
(7.555)
p = 0.2 Years: 1947-68
3
Asymptotic standard errors are not presented in (5.4) and (5.5) since they
are for comparative purposes only and the extra computation (which is indeed extra)
does not seem warranted. They would be much the same as in (5.3).
2
Our new scrap figures, for reasons of consistency, were taken as Direct Use
of Scrap plus Secondary Refined less Old Scrap. See the Data Appendix.
3
Estimation was by Fair's method with additional instrumental variables, the
lagged EMJ and LME prices, lagged U.S. mine production, and U.S. industrial produc-
tion.
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We could find no evidence of a significant price effect here. The elasticity
with respect to USC is 1.48 at the point of means.
Outside the U.S., the data do not permit a breakdown into old and new scrap
and we estimated a single equation for total scrap supply. This was necessarily
a hybrid of the two types estimated for the U.S. Denoting rest-of-world secondary
*
supply by RWS and rest-of-world total consumption by RWC (both in thousands of
metric tons) , the results were as follows:
/ RWS \ / RWS _i \
(5.7) Log/ j\- - A. 221 - 0.6278 Log/ t 1 )
\53,000+K/ (0.4729) \53,000+K /
(-1.328) t
J RWC \
+ 0.2546 Log USP + 0.9534 Log' j- )
(0.09879) (0.3204) ,53,000 +K /
(2.557) (2.978)
p = 0.2 Years: 1952-68
2
Short-run price elasticity is about +.25 and short-run elasticity with
respect to total copper consumption about +.95. The corresponding long-run
figures are about +.16 and +.52. In comparing these to the U.S. figures, the
hybrid nature of the equation should be recalled, whence it is clear that they
are not very different.
"Rest-of-world" in any section of this study means the countries not
explicitly studied in that section. Thus, here, the term refers to all countries
outside the U.S. (excluding Eastern-bloc countries). In the equation, K* is, of
course, for those countries, not for the U.S. and is cumulated from 1950, rather
than 1948.
2
The estimation method was similar to that described above for U.S. old
scrap, except that we formed not only USP and used its logarithm as an instru-
mental variable, but also RWC* and used its 'logarithm as an instrumental variable.
In this first stage of the procedure, the same regression was used as before to
form USP
. In the formation of RWC*, the regressors were the lagged EMJ and LME
prices, lagged RWC
, and the two lagged sums of mine productions.
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6. Demand
1
We come now to the estimation of demand equations for copper. Separate
demand equations were estimated for the United States, Europe, Japan, and the
rest of the world. Attempts to estimate separate equations for individual Eur-
opean countries did not result in very satisfactory demand equations, although
the results for Europe as a whole were reasonably satisfactory. Why this should
be true is hard to say. Aside from purely statistical reasons, such as the pos-
sibility that the disturbances in the demand equations in two neighboring coun-
tries may be negatively correlated, a partial explanation may lie in either of
two facts. First, individual European countries may differ in the skill with
which they manage to buy on the LME . If the success of their buying agents var-
ies over time, the use of an annual LME figure may be better for Europe as a
whole than for individual countries. Second, we have treated industrial produc-
tion as a single aggregate. If intra-European exports have a different conper-
using component than European industrial production generally, then an aggregate
relation in which such exports are netted out may do better than individual
ones. Neither of these explanations seems wholly satisfactory, however.
The relative importance of the various areas in copper consumption can be
seen from the figures for 1963:
As used in this study, "demand" means "total use". See above
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TABLE 6.1
Total Use of Copper, 1963 (thousand metric tons)
United States 2320.4
Europe 2631*8
Japan 592.1
Rest of World3 526.0
Total3 6070.3
Excludes Eastern-bloc countries.
We begin with the United States, for which data are best.
It is clear that the principal elements of a cooper demand equation must be
the price of copper, the price of substitutes, and measures of industrial activ-
ity. For the first, we used USP , the EMJ price deflated by the U.S. wholesale
price index. The remaining variables require some discussion, however.
The principal substitute for copper is, of course, aluminum. The obvious
choice for a price to use is the deflated U.S. price of aluminum (deflation of
course takes care of more general substitutes for copper) . When this was attemp-
ted, the attempt failed, but it failed in an informative way. Without the inclu-
sion of any aluminum price, a reasonably satisfactory looking demand equation
was obtained. When the U.S. aluminum price was included, however, not only did
its coefficient fail to be positive (as should be the case for a substitute), but
it was significantly negative and the whole equation changed radically. One can
not properly conclude from this merely that aluminum substitution fails to show up
in the U.S. demand equation for copper; it obviously shows up in a way which can
not be ignored, but which does not make economic sense.
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Fortunately, the reason for this is fairly easy to find. During some of the
period, the U.S. price of aluminum was a controlled price and aluminum was ra-
tioned. The U.S. aluminum price, therefore, is not a proper index of the cost of
shifting to aluminum. Since data on the extent of rationing are hard to come by,
a reasonably satisfactory wav to take account of this is to use a free market alu-
minum price as an index of the real cost of obtaining aluminum. Since the London
price was also controlled for Dart of the period, the most readily available price
is the German price of aluminum in Deutschmarks per 100 kilograms and we used
this converted to dollars and deflated by the U.S. wholesale price index (1957-
59 = 1.00). It is denoted by USA1P, but the initials represent the deflator and
not the source of the money price.
Since even a short-run adjustment to Drices is likely to be delayed, we used
both copper and aluminum prices lagged by one year, so that demand depends on last
year's (and previous years') prices.
There is more than one possible choice for an index of copper-using industrial
activity. The two most obvious are the Federal Reserve Board Index of Industrial
Production and the FRB Index of Construction Materials. Ideally, one would want
to use both, but they are so correlated that no sensible result is obtained when
both are included. We present results below using each. The Industrial Production
Index (1963 = 100) is denoted by USIP and the Construction Materials Index
(1957-59 = 100) by USCM.
One more matter needs to be discussed before proceeding to the results. A
demand equation should not include changes in inventories of copDer. Changes in
We have treated the aluminum orice as exogenous to the copper market (in
the short run) which is somewhat questionable but perhaps not too bad an
approximation.
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inventories of copper held as such are not included in the consumption data; they
are treated separately below. There is another way in which copper inventories
can be held, however; that is in the form of fabricated products. Unfortunately,
there are no data on the inventories of copper fabricated products. There are
data, however, on inventories of durable goods. If we assume that the change in
the copper content of such inventories is reasonably linearly related to the
total change in the inventories themselves, then that total change should be in-
cluded in the demand equation. We denote it as AUSID. (It is measured in billions of
dollars deflated by the U.S. wholesale price index, 1957-59 = 1.00.)
This argument has an important further and testable consequence, however.
We are using a Koyck distributed lag in copper demand, as described in section 3,
above, and already used for sudoIv. The logic of the adjustment model leading
to that lag suggests that the appropriate lagged variable to use is not lagged
copper consumption as measured, but lagged copper consumption corrected for the
(lagged) change in durable inventories. This, however, leads to the following.
The basic assumption on which we include the change in inventories in the
equation is that the change in copper inventories held as finished goods is lin-
early related to the total change in inventories, that is, that the change in
such copper inventories in year t is well approximated by a term (a + BAUSID )
.
Denoting U.S. copper consumption in year t as measured (thousands of metric tons)
by USC
,
the stock adjustment model implies that instead of having USC on the
right (where u = 1 - X is the speed of adjustment; see section 3), we should have
(USC - a - BAUSID ) on the left and (USC - a - BAUSID ) on the right, so
that the full demand equation reads (letting yX stand symbolically for all the
other variables already discussed)
:
This includes copoer that will become new scrap. See above.
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(6.1) USC - a - BAUSID = 6 + yX + X(USC - a - 6AUSID
_
) ,
where 6 is a parameter. Rearranging this, we obtain:
(6.2) USC = (<5 + a - Xo) + yX + 8AUSID
t
- XBAUSID + XUSC
so that not only should AUSID , be included, but its coefficient should turn
out to be minus the product of the coefficients of AUSID and USC .. It would,
of course, be possible (although slightly cumbersome) to impose this constraint
in estimating the equation, but it is far preferable not to impose it and to see
whether it is approximately satisfied in the results. If it is, we have gained
a check on a joint implication of the adjustment model assumed and the argument
as to inventories of copper held in finished form. In the event, the constraint
is indeed approximately satisfied, thus reinforcing our faith in the assumptions
made.
We are now ready for the results. When the Index of Construction Materials
is used, the estimated demand equation is:
(6-3) USC = - 194.7 - 1526 USP_M _ . +972.1 USAIP . + 7.029 USCM
(190.3) EWt
- 1
(479.4) t
~ 1 (1.265) C
(-8.020) (2.028) (5.557)
+ 54.11 AUSID - 39.97 AUSID + 0.7363 USC .
(5.904) (7.667) t L (0.1218) t_1
(9.166) (-5.213) (6.046)
2 1 9R = 0.991 p = -0.8 Years: 1950-58, 1962-66 *
1
~~
7In equations estimated by the Hildreth-Lu technique, 1 - R is the sum of
squares of errors in the original equation to be estimated divided by the centered
sum of squares of the dependent variable in that equation.
2
As with all the equations the years' figures indicate the observations on
the dependent variable directly used in the final regression. Two earlier years
of data are used in the estimation method.
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When the Index of Industrial Production is used, the results are similar,
being:
(6.4) USC = - 14.75 - 1237 USP + 829.0 USAIP +5.073 USIP
C (175.2) bMJt L (464.2) t l (0.9134) t
(-7.060) (1.786) (5.559)
+ 60.49 AUSID - 44.40 AUSID + 0.7910 USC
(6.413) C (7.102) C (0.1126) C
(9.431) (-6.251) (7.024)
R
2
= 0.991 p = -0.8 Years: 1950-58, 1962-66
In either case, the results are spectacularly good. Most of the estimated
coefficients are several times their asymptotic standard errors, the only excep-
tion being the coefficient of aluminum price in (6.4). It is particularly note-
worthy that this is true of the coefficient of copper price, an unusual feature
for econometric estimates of demand equations.
More important than this, every coefficient has the expected sign and the
constraint on the coefficient of AUSID
_
is very closely satisfied. In (6.3),
that coefficient is - 39.97, whereas the product of the coefficients of AUSID
and USC
,
is 39.84; in (6.4), the coefficient is - 44.40, whereas the corresponding
product is 47.84.
In terms of elasticities, the two equations are very close. From (6.3), at
the point of means for the period, the elasticity of copper consumption with
respect to copper price is - .2131 in the short run and - .9002 in the long run.
These are elasticities of USC with respect to the several variables, not
of copper consumption after the implicit correction for the change in durable goods
inventories. The latter cannot be computed without some assumption about the
constant term, a, which appears in (6.1).
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From (6.4), the corresponding figures are - .1727 and - .8168, respectively. The
elasticity with respect to the price of aluminum implied by (6.1) is + .2392 in
the short run and +1.010 in the long run; the corresponding figures from (6.4)
are + .2040 and + .9759, respectively. Finally, the elasticity with respect to
the Index of Construction Materials is .3318 in the short run and 1.402 in the
long run, from (6.3). The comparable elasticities from (6.4) with respect to the
Index of Industrial Production are .1529 and .7317 respectively. "Jote that the
last set of elasticities measures roughly the same thing in both equations, since
in either equation, the variable in question is serving as a proxy for economic
activity in general.
When we turn to consuming areas outside the United States, the results are
less strikingly good. In large part, this is probably due to the better quality
of U.S. data. In particular, much better data on changes in stocks of copper
exist for the U.S. than for most other countries; moreover, only for the U.S. was
it possible to utilize data on stocks of durable goods in general to perform the
correction for copper held in the form of finished goods which proved so specta-
cularly successful in (6.3) and (6.4).
The demand equation for Europe is similar to that for the United States, in
that it includes copper price, aluminum price, lagged copper consumption, and an
index of industrial activity. The copper money price used was, of course, the
LME price (£per long ton)
,
and the aluminum money price used was again the German
The linear form used for the demand equation must be considered only an
approximation, especially where such activity variables are concerned, so these
last elasticities have perhaps less meaning than do the elasticities with respect
to copper and aluminum prices.
33
aluminum price (DM per 100 kilograms). Both of these were then converted to dollars.
Construction of an appropriate deflator requires some discussion, however.
For each European country, we formed a dollar-equivalent wholesale price in-
dex, by taking the country's own wholesale price index (1958 = 1.00) and dividing
it by an index of the country's exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar. The latter
was an index of local currency per dollar, scaled to be 1.00 in 1958. These indi-
vidual country indices, being now in a common unit, were then combined in a weighted
average, the weights being proportional to 1963 industrial production (these are the
weights given by the OECD to its European members in its industrial production in-
dex ). The weights are as follows:
TABLE 6.2
Weights of Individual Countries in European Price Index (percent)
Ge rmany 26.6
United Kingdom 21.3
France 19.6
Italy 10.0
Belgium and Luxembourg 3.5
Sweden 3.5
Switzerland 3.5
Netherlands 3.3
Spain 3.3
Austria 2.0
Finland 1.3
Portugal 0.8
Greece 0.5
Ireland 0.5
Total 100.
o
c
Individual weights as given do not sum to 100.0 because of rounding.
General Statistics
,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(Paris, OECD, 1970)
.
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Three different indices of production were tried, all with very similar results.
They were the OECD Europe industrial production index, the UN index of manufac-
turing, and the UN index of industrial production. The UN indices have somewhat
wider coverage than the OECD index. We report the result using the UN index of
industrial production.
The dependent variable was total use of copper (thousands of metric tons)
for all non-communist Europe. We denote it by EURC. The two prices are denoted
by EURP and EURA1P, respectively, and the index of industrial production
1958 = 100) by EURIP.
The estimated European demand equation is:
(6.5) EURC = - 1220 -2693 EURP +285200 EURAIP .
( 1961)
Z (249200) C L
(-1.373) (1.144)
+ 904. 5 EURIP + .5426 EURC
(579.5) (.3395)
(1.561) (1.598)
R
2
= 0.9335 p = - 0.1 Years: 1952-68
The elasticities at the point of means are as follows: with respect to
copper price, - .0878 in the short run and - .1920 in the long run; with respect
to aluminum price, + .6133 in the short run and 1.341 in the long run; and with
respect to industrial production, + .4534 in the short run and + .9913 in the
long run.
The results indicate a rather slower speed of adjustment than was found for
the United States. Elasticities with respect to copper price are rather lower
and with respect to aluminum price rather higher than for the United States.
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Elasticities with respect to industrial production are roughly the same.
It must be remembered, however, that the results for Europe are not nearly
so reliable as those for the U.S. Moreover, it is not possible to make all the
same adjustments for changes in copper stocks as for the U.S., so that, in parti-
cular, the effect of changes in the stocks of cooper held as finished goods are
included rather than being separatelv accounted for. Given this, it is nontrivial
to have obtained a demand equation with all coefficients being of the expected
sign and reasonable magnitude and bigger than their respective asymptotic standard
errors
.
The results for Japanese demand are rather different. Here alone in the
model, we could find no evidence of a lagged adjustment process. This may be due
to the very rapid growth of the Japanese economy, since a situation in which a
significant fraction of industrial capacity is new each year is likely also to be
a situation in which a significant part of copper demand does not depend on the
relative adjustment of old capacity to new price situations. Nevertheless, it
seems doubtful that adjustment is so rapid as to be complete in a single year
(although it must be remembered the price entered in the model is last year's
price) .
Moreover, related also to the rapid growth of Japan is the fact that we
would expect the variables with large effect on Japanese copper demand to be those
which are related to industrial production. Despite this, we did find a negative
effect of copper price; aluminum price, on the other hand, did not appear to play
any role.
We present two equations which differ only in the measure of copper-using
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activity. (The two measures are too collinear to use in the same equation.)
The first of these is an index of total industrial production (1955 = 100) and
denoted by JIP . The second is an index of the production of construction mater-
ials (1955 = 100) denoted JCM. The price variable used was the LME price expressed
in yen per long ton, deflated by the Japanese wholesale price index (1958 = 1.00).
It is denoted by JP . Japanese consumption of copper (thousands of metric tons)
is denoted by JC.
The two equations are as follows:
(6.6) JC = 124.2 - .0001587 JP + 1.723 JIP
1 (.00008916) (0.0716)
(-1.780) (24.06)
R
2
= .982 p = 0.0 Years: 1951-68
(6.7) JC = 66.96 - .0001574 JP + 2.433 JCM
t (.0001067) LMht l (0.1413) t
(-1.475) " (17.22)
R
2
= .975 p = 0.1 Years: 1954-68 .
The results using the total industrial production index seem somewhat more
reliable than those using the index of construction materials, although this may
merely reflect the fact that they are based on three more years of data. In any
case, the implications of both equations are quite similar. There is no difference
between short and long-run elasticities. From (6.6), the elasticity of Japanese
consumption with respect to price is-.09428at the point of means for the period;
from (6.7), that elasticity is-. 1184 . From (6.6), at the point of means, the
elasticity with respect to the index of industrial production is .6014; from (6.7),
the comparable elasticity with respect to the index of construction materials is
.9921.
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Finally, a demand equation was estimated for the rest of the world. Here
the prices were the LME price, and the German aluminum price, both expressed in dol-
lars and both deflated by the U.S. wholesale price index (1957-59 = 1.00 ).
The former price is denoted (as before) by USP and the latter, as before, by
2
USA1P . For a production index, we used that compiled by the UN . It is denoted
by RWIP. The dependent variable is rest-of-world total use of copper (thousands
of metric tons) and is denoted by RWC. The results are as follows:
(6.8) RWC = - 11.82 - .1212 USP + .8828USA1P
t (.03746) LM" l (3.014 ) t
L
(-3.237) (0.2929)
+ 1.971 RWIP + .7646 RWC
(0.8127) t (.1613) t
(2.426 ) (4.740)
R
2
= .939 p = - 0.3 Years: 1951-68
The result as to the effects of aluminum price is unreliable, the remaining
coefficients are considerably larger than their asymptotic standard errors. At
the point of means, the estimated elasticities are as follows: with respect to
copper price, - .2177 in the short run and - .9248 in the long run; with respect
to aluminum price, + .1074 in the short run and + .4561 in the long run; and with
respect to industrial production, + .4087 in the short run and + 1.736 in the
long run. The price elasticities are fairly similar to those found for the United
States
.
This is not a very satisfactory deflator, but it is difficult to see how
to improve it much.
2
Excluding U.S., Europe, and Japan.
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In general, the demand results show copper demand to be rather inelastic
with respect to copper price, even in the long run. The most important deter-
minants of copper demand, as one would expect, are the levels of industrial
activity in the consuming countries.
7. Prices
So far, there are two prices directly used in the model, the LME price and
the EMJ price. As already mentioned, however, the latter is a constructed price
which is very closely associated with the U.S. producer nrice. Indeed, expressing
all three in common units, and denoting the three prices by P„WT , PT ._, , and P„ .,EMJ LME' Prod
least squares regression (with no constant term) reveals
:
(7.1) P___ = .9762 P„ + .01538 PTM,EMJt (.00842) Pr° dt (.007045) LMEt
(115.9 ) (2.183 )
R
2
= .999 Years: 1946-68
The sum of the coefficients is not very different from unity.
We have already outlined in the introductory section the way in which the
model describes the setting of the U.S. producer price. Essentiallv, that price
is set as a long-run price, being ad-justed relatively slowly. Adjustments in it
are made in response to indications that the U.S. market is drifting out of equi-
librium. One such indication is clearly the accumulation of private stocks of
copper in the United States; another is a large difference between the U.S. pro-
ducer price and the LME price. We find both of these to have a definite effect.
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Denoting the change in U.S. private stocks of copper during year t by AUSS
and measuring it in thousands of metric tons, we divide it by U.S. consumption
in year t to obtain a measure of the relative size of stocks. Assuming that
decisions are taken for this year with an eye to last year's variables, we enter
the resulting ratio lagged as well as the lagged difference between the LME and
the U.S. producer price. Denoting deflation by the U.S. wholesale price index
(1957-59 = 1.00) by the prefix US, as before, the estimated equation is (where
all prices are in deflated dollars per long ton)
:
AUSS
(7.2) USP_ .. = 320.8 - 1856
„cr + .2689 (USP TMT7<. . - USP_ . .)Prodt
(825.4V
SC
t-l (.1461) LMEt
" 1 Pl°dt"1
(-2.248) (1.840)
+ .5980 USP„
,
,
(.2452) Pr°dt
- 1
(2.438)
R
2
= .556 p - 0.2 Years: 1952-66
1
Note that while the speed of adjustment is well below unity, it is high
relative to that found for supply adjustments and for U.S. demand adjustment.
About forty percent of the gap between desired and actual price is covered in
2
a year. The other two coefficients have the expected sign.
1967 and 1968 were omitted because of the copper strike. Figures on the
change in government stocks of copper required to calculate the change in private
stocks are not available before 1949.
2
Elasticity calculations do not make much sense for this equation, since both
of the operative variables can (and do) change sign over the period.
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We turn now to the equation explaining the LME price. Here also we expect
the size of copper stocks to play the chief role (although, of course, these will
be stocks outside the U.S.); however, the rationale behind this is a bit differ-
ent than in the case of the U.S. producer price. Whereas that price is an admin-
istered price and the equation just reported described the behavior of those ad-
ministering it, the LME price is basically a free price. The equation describing
LME price determination is hence one describing the behavior of a market. In
effect, one can think of the LME price as adjusting until holders of stocks are
satisfied to hold them. On this view, it should be the size of stocks (relative
to consumption) rather than the change in stocks that counts for the LME price;
however, as one might expect the relationship to be a long-run one, it is sensible
to use a distributed lag and also to investigate the effect of lagged stocks as
well as current ones.
When this is done, however, a striking result emerges. In every version of
2
the equation tried , what appears to matter is the change in the stocks-consumption
There is a vast literature on this subject. See, for example, Telser [11].
2
There were a number of these. They included versions with and without lagged
price and with current and lagged stocks-consumption ratios being for year t and t-1
or for year t-1 and t-2. In addition, since stocks figures do not exist for the
total non-U. S. region, they had to be constructed by cumulating figures for changes
in stocks from the estimates given in the next section. This is a satisfactory
procedure, given a benchmark estimate of stock level in a particular year, but no
such estimate exists except for the U.S. where only the change in stocks enters the
model in any case. For the rest of the world, stocks were arbitrarily assumed zero
at the end of 1949. The only effect of this is in the equation under discussion
where stock levels are divided by consumption. This suggests adding a correction to
the equation in the form of the current and lagged reciprocals of consumption. When
this was done, the corrections mattered little, but the phenomenon under discussion
in the text persisted. Note that the change in the stocks-consumotion ratio is very
close to the change in stocks divided by consumption so that the correction should
not matter if only changes are important; this slightly reinforces that finding.
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ratio and not its level. Indeed, when the change and the level of the ratio are
both used in the equation (which is equivalent to using both the current and the
lagged values of the ratio) , not only is the coefficient of the level very close
to zero (and small relative to its asymptotic standard error) but also it is
slightly positive, which does not make economic sense.
Denoting the level of Rest-of-World stocks at the end of year t by
RWS , the two best equations were as follows:
/RWS RWS \
(7.3) USPTM_. = 285.6 - 3620 1=-^ -
l L
) + .7957 USP ,LMEt (1565.5?WC t RWC t-l' (.4886) LMEt
- 1
(-2.312) (1.628)
p = -0.3 Years: 1952-68
and
/RWS RWS \
(7 - 4) USPIMFt
= 415 ' 2
"
1939 ' 7 VpI^" " RWC^V + ' 596 ° USPLMEt-lL K (738.8)V KKtjt-l ^t-Z' (.1769) m i
(-2.626) (3.369)
p = -0.1 Years: 1953-68
Now, the difficulty in accepting equations such as these is their long-run
implications under certain circumstances. In them, the LME price goes down when
stocks go up relative to consumption, a perfectly reasonable result. The possibly
surprising thing, however, is that if one considers what would eventually happen
to price if the stocks-consumption ratio were to remain unchanged indefinitely,
the implication is that the LME nrice would approach an equilibrium level inde-
pendent of the level at which the stocks-consumption ratio remained constant.
The only instrumental variables used in estimating (7.4) were those
required by Fair's method.
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What the stocks-consumDtion ratio had been doing before entering the constant phase
would matter for the short and middle run, but in the long run, a constant stocks-
consumption ratio would lead to the same price, whatever the constant level.
This is not a result which is instantaneously acceptable, although its impor-
tance for short-run or even middle-run forecasting is extremely limited. We can,
however, go a long way toward rationalizing it along the following lines.
The LME price not only adjusts according to the desire to hold copper stocks,
but, much more fundamentally, it serves as the long-run equilibrator of supply and
demand. If, over a very long period, there is no change in the stocks which people
desire to hold, then stocks asymptotically fail to affect the price which asymp-
totically approaches the level at which long-run supply and long-run demand are in
balance so that stocks will not in fact change. We have already seen, however, that
the supply of copper is extremely elastic in the long run, so that such an asymp-
totic price, so far as we can predict, is a constant (in real terms) approximating
the almost horizontal level of the long-run supply curve.
Indeed, if we recall that the change in stocks is defined as the difference
between total supply and total demand, it becomes apparent that the price adjust-
ment equations merely state that price adjusts in the direction of excess demand
and does not move (in the long run) if supply and demand are in long-run balance.
It must be emphasized, however, that such arguments and implications are only
asymptotic and that speeds of adjustment are slow enough in the copper industry
that the long run is very long and not very relevant. Short-run movements in
demand (and supply) and consequent short-run changes in stock will have much more
to do with the price over any reasonable horizon than will whatever asymptotic
level would be approached were everything forever in equilibrium.
For what it is worth, however, the asymptotic equilibrium level of the LME
price is $1506/long ton from (7.3), $1164/long ton from (7.4) (in 1969 dollars).
This compares to an average price of $1490 (current dollars) In 1969.
This is consistent with the argument in Herfindahl [5, pp. 230-235] that
long-run marginal costs in copper supply are nearly constant.
A3
It must be sharply emphasized that this statement in no way constitutes a pre-
diction that the LME price will approach this level over the next several years.
We shall return to this in the section on forecasting.
8. Closing the Model
There remain only three more relationships to close the model. These are
the two identities accounting for changes in stocks and the equation describing
net exports of copper from the rest of the world into the United States.
The first two are easy to describe. Let AUSGS be the change in United
States government stocks during year t (thousands of metric tons) and let RWX
denote net exports from the rest of the world to the United States (thousands
of metric tons) . Then the change in United States private stocks is given by
the identity:
(8.1) AUSS = USMP + USOS + USNS + RWX - USC - AUSGS
t t t t t t t
which is to say that the change in U.S. private stocks is the total supply
(mine production, old scrap, new scrap, and imports) less consumption and the
amount going into U.S. government stocks. Note that new scrap is included in
our consumption figures and is netted out of the change in stocks, as it should be,
since what matters is copper put through the refining process once during the year
less the disappearance of copper into true consumption and government stocks.
A similar identity gives the change in stocks in the rest of the world.
As already remarked in an earlier footnote, there are no benchmark figures for the
size of stocks outside the U.S., so we have cumulated the change in stocks from
the end of 1949. Aside from our inability to account for governmental stocks
Excluding scrap already counted in old scrap collections. See above.
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outside the U.S., therefore, our rest-of-world stock figures differ from correct
ones by an unknown constant. This matters only to the LME price equation, and,
as discussed in the preceding section, it matters very little since only changes
appear to be important in that equation.
The identity giving the change in rest-of-world stocks is:
(8.2) ARWS = ChMP + CanMP + ZMP + RWMP + RWS
- EURC - JC - RWC - RWX
which says that the change in rest-of-world stocks is given by the sum of mine
production outside the U.S. (Chile, Canada, Zambia, and rest-of-world) plus
rest-of-world scrap supply less consumption of copper outside the U.S. (Europe,
Japan, and rest-of-world) less net exports to the U.S.
The estimation of the equation explaining net exports to the United States
(RWX) is not a simple matter. One naturally expects a prime factor in that
equation to be the difference between the producer price and the LME price, but
simple attempts to explain net exports by this difference do not get very far.
The reason is not hard to find. When a producer price is well below the LME
price, there is often rationing of primary copper in the United States and
copper may flow into rather than out of that country.
This suggests several devices to try. One of these is to divide the difference
between producer price and LME price into two variables, depending on whether that
difference is positive or negative. In fact, when this was done, the results were
often suggestive, but when the other variables about to be discussed were added to
Figures on government stocks do not exist. The only non-U. S. government
stocks whose existence are known to us were held in small amounts by the United
Kingdom during the Korean War.
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the equation, the coefficients on the two price-difference variables became
almost equal, lending powerful support to the view that the other variables had
adequately accounted for the rationing problem.
Those other variables were two. The first is the excess of U.S. consumption
over U.S. mine production, an indication of the shortfall which must be filled by
secondary copper, stock changes, and imports. The second, denoted XD, is a dummy
variable representing the presence or absence of export controls in the United
States (recall that RWX is net exports) . This variable was given the value of
unity for 1949-52, 1955-56, and 1966-68. For 1953, it was set at .75, for 1954
at .25, and for 1957 at .5 (fractional values occurring when controls were imposed
or taken off in the middle of a year). For all other years, the variable was set
equal to zero.
The resulting equation was as follows (note that the prices are in deflated
dollars per metric ton)
:
(8.3) RWX
t
= - 795.5 + 1. 397^(USPprodt
- USP^^)
(2.2138)
+ .9340 (USC - USMP ) + 145.8 XD
(0.4238)
t t (55.22)
(2.204) (2.640)
p = -o.l Years: 1952-68 .
The results are strikingly good, particularly since, as mentioned, attempts to
explain net exports without the two final variables lead to very poor results.
Elasticity calculations do not mean much when the variables lie close to zero,
so we do not give them. An increase in the U.S. producer price of one cent per
pound, with the LME price constant, increases net exports to the U.S. by about
46
31 thousand metric tons other things equal. (By way of comparison, net exports
were about 201 thousand metric tons in 1963, so there is substantial price sen-
sitivity.) An increase in the gap between U.S. consumption and mine production
is filled, other things equal, about 93% by imports into the U.S. This figure
seems a little high, but (aside from the fact that a more plausible figure would
lie within one asymptotic standard error of the point estimate) it must be remem-
bered that this is not the same statement as the assertion that 93% of the entire
gap is filled by imports. Even if the two prices were identical and export con-
trols not present, the large negative constant term would mean that much less of
the gap is filled on the average than at the margin.
In the estimation of (8.3), the following instrumental variables were used
in addition to those required by the Fair method: lagged mine production (including
the United States) and lagged stocks/use outside the United States.
Note that XD was taken as exogenous (indeed it is the only exogenous variable
in (8.3)).
It is true, of course, that the imposition of export controls is a function of
the situation in the United States copper market. We assume that it depends on
lagged rather than current variables, however.
47
9. General Conclusions
In the first section, we outlined the general way in which the model works.
Part II of this study will discuss specific forecasts. Intermediate between such
general and such specific discussions, however, are the conclusions to be drawn
from the model as estimated and reported in the preceding sections. This section
rather briefly discusses some of the more important such conclusions.
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The central overriding fact about the copper market is the very high elasti-
city of supnly coupled with a low adjustment speed and relatively low short-run
elasticities. This means that while long-run equilibrium price — in the sense
of that price which would make long-run sunnlv equal long-run demand for current
levels of the various exogenous variables — may be well below current price,
there is no very marked tendency for nrice to approach such a long-run equili-
brium. This occurs because of general growth in the activity variables influ-
encing demand. Steady growth in those variables, even at a relatively low rate,
leads to prices forever above long-run equilibrium because of the inelasticity
of short-run supply. In essence, the demand curve is continually shifting out-
ward and new supply coming slowly into nroduction.
On the other hand, this very fact means that prices are very sensitive to a
reduction in the rate of growth of the exogenous activity variables and especially
to a decrease therein. If those variables slacken their growth rate or stop grow-
ing altogether, the new supnly induced by nreviously high prices will come onstream
and prices will drop. Since demand is relatively price inelastic, such a" drop
can be quite substantial. Indeed, it is clear that whereas the high long-
run elasticity of supply makes for a stable, if largely irrelevant long-run
price, the low short-run elasticities of supply and demand make for a rela-
tively unstable short-run price which is very sensitive to changes in general
economic conditions. This is more true of the LME price than it is of the
U.S. producer price whose fluctuations are deliberately reduced by the price-
setters, but it is somewhat ture of the latter price as well.
This basic result was also found in a preliminary study done some years
ago by one of the authors. See Fisher [ 4]
•
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The way in which such instability enters the model is, of course, through
stock accumulation. A fall in demand, given the low short-run and high long-run
elasticity of supply leads to a sharp increase in copper stocks. This in turn
depresses the price, which, indeed will remain depressed so long as stock accumu-
lation continues. An upturn in general economic conditions, on the other hand,
will lead to an outward shift in demand and a decumulation of stocks, providing
an upward push on price. Because of the long time required to make adjustments,
however, the actual timepath of prices is not a simple one. Part II of this
study discusses forecasts of that path) and of the timepath of the other vari-
ables as well) under various assumptions as to Chilean supply.
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APPENDIX : Data Used in the Model
Almost all data on copper was obtained from the annual publication
Metal Statistics Metallgesellschaf t Akliengesellschaf t (Frankfurt Am Main)
.
This source seems the most reliable , consistent source of data covering the
world industry although for just the U.S. more detailed data are available
from the Bureau of Mines and the Copper development Association. The data
in Metal Statistics are revised frequently and so the most recent figure
available was used. In order that the reader may check the definition of the
variables used in the model we give, below, page number references to the
1969 edition of Metal Statistics (56th Annual Issue)
.
Prices
The EMJ and UIE prices were taken from the average figure in Metal
Statistics
,
Dage 284. The producer nrice from Metal Statistics: The Pur-
chasing Guide of the Metal Industries (The American Me tal Market Company:
New York) . The figure was the average producer price of electrolytic copper
(page 131 of the 1970 edition).
Wholesale nrice indexes were taken from the UN Statistical Yearbook and
exchange rates from International Financial Statistics (The International
Monetary Fund)
.
Primary Supply
Mine production for the US (page 190) , Chile (page 196) , Canada (page
198), Zambia (nage 188). The rest of world figure was the Free World
Figure (page 19) less the countries above.
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Mine production rather than smelter production was used because some
secondary copper is introduced at the smelting stage. Since we estimate secon-
dary production separately using smelter would involve double-counting.
Secondary Supply
Total Scrap supply for the US was taken as the sum of production of
secondary refined copper nlus direct use of scran (page 190) . Direct use of
scrap includes new and old scrap in good condition which does not require
re-refining. For the US there is a figure for old scrap (page 190) which
we used to estimate the old scrap model. The difference between total scran
supply and old scrap was then used in the new scran model. Sample figures
for 1963 are given below:
United States Scrap
1) Production of Secondary 274.0
Refined Copper
2) Direct Use of Scrap 738.0
3) Total ScraD Supply 1012.0
(1) + 2))
4) Old Scrap 382.7
5) New Scrap
(3) - 4))
629.3
The figure for 5) does not correspond to the new scrap figure given on page
190 of Metal Statistics since the latter excludes direct use of new scrap.
For the rest of the world the total scrap supply was defined in the same
way as direct use plus secondary refined (nage 25) . There is no breakdown
into old scrap for countries other than the US.
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Rest of World Scrap
1) Production of Secondary Refined 388.0
2) Direct Use 940.9
3) Total Scrap Supply 1328.9
(1) + 2))
In computing the figure for K (the stock of copper lying around)
we used primary production from page 19H, net imports of refined from pages
192 and 193, and change in stocks was the computed figure explained below.
The net imports of fabricated items were from page 1^4 with each item
weighted approximately by copper content. The weights were based on McMahon
Copper: A Materials Survey (US Bureau of Mines, 1965) and were as follows:
Weights Used in Calculating Net Imports of Copper Fabrications
Copper (Scrap, Alloy Scrap {Copper content } 1.0
rods, tubes, wire, plate, other)
Brass (rods, tubes, wire) 0.65
Muntz metal 0.60
Zinc (wire, rods, powder) 0.70
Net imports for the rest of the world are the negative of the US figure.
Demand
The total use of copper figure for each country's demand equation was
consumption of refined copper plus direct (or actual) use of scrap. Figures
are given on pages 24 and 25.
The exogenous variables used in the demand equations were obtained as
follows
:
1) Indexes of Industrial production for all countries and groups of
countries from UN Statistical Yearbook
2) German price of aluminum from: Metal Statistics, page 277 (average)
3) US index of Construction Materials from: The Bulletin of the
Federal Reserve Board
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4) US Inventories of Durables from: The Economic Report of the
President
5) Japanese Index of Construction Materials from: Monthly
Statistics of Japan .
54
Stocks of Copper
Stocks of copper were computed as a residual and the best explanation
is provided by the sample figures given below:
SAMPLE FIGURES FOR THE UNITED STATES (1963)
Thousands of Metric Tons
Mine Production 1100.600
Net Imports of Refined, Unrefined, and Ores 201.958
Old Scrap 382.700
New Scrap 629.300
Total Supply (1) +2) +3) + 4)) 2314.558
Total Use of Copper 2320.400
Decrease in Stocks (6) - 5)) 5.842
Decrease in Government Stocks 10.310
Increase in Private Stocks (8) - 7)) 4.468
The figures are all from Metal Statistics except i) government stocks which
came from McMahon [ 8, p. 252] and Copper Development Association [ 2] and
ii) imports of copper ores which were from [ 2], up to 1953.
A similar computation was made for the rest of the world except that
figures for government stocks (held by the UK government for a short period)
were not available. Net imports of the rest of the world are the negative
of the US figure.
The figures for changes in stocks do not provide a benchmark. For
the US the benchmark for private stocks was 614.162 thousand metric tons
at the end of 1949. This figure was stocks of copper at primary smelting
plants plus refined copper held by fabricators reported in McMahon [ 8, p. 250]
For the rest of the world, the benchmark was zero at the end of 1949.
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